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Notes
THE PATRIOT ACT’S IMPACT ON THE
GOVERNMENT’S ABILITY TO CONDUCT
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF ONGOING
DOMESTIC COMMUNICATIONS
NATHAN C. HENDERSON
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World
1
Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress enacted the USA Patriot
2
Act of 2001. To achieve the Act’s stated objective of making it easier
for federal agents to identify and investigate possible terrorist
threats,3 Congress modified preexisting surveillance law, which,
among other things, established the conditions under which the government could electronically monitor various types of ongoing communications4 within the United States in nonemergency situations.5

Copyright © 2002 by Nathan C. Henderson.
1. More than three thousand people died during the attacks. Dead and Missing, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at A11.
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act] (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
3. Id., 115 Stat. at 272 (stating that the purpose of the Act is to “deter and punish terrorist
attacks . . . [and] enhance law enforcement investigatory tools”).
4. The government also has the power to access stored communications, such as stored emails or voicemails. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000), amended by Patriot Act § 209, 115 Stat. at 283.
Since stored communications are accessed after they have already been sent and received, government access does not occur while the communication is actually ongoing. Consequently, any
analysis of the government’s power to access stored communications is outside the scope of this
Note.
5. If, for instance, the government knew that a terrorist attack were imminent, the government might be able conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant. See 50 U.S.C. §
1803(e) (2000) (stating that the government can conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to
obtain foreign intelligence information if the Attorney General reasonably determines that an
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This body of law is referred to throughout this Note as “electronic
surveillance law,” and it is the Patriot Act’s impact on this body of
law that is the sole focus of this Note.
This Note argues that, even though some of the Patriot Act
modifications to the preexisting electronic surveillance law do not engender significant privacy concerns, the modifications considered in
their entirety do pose a threat. The threat, however, is one that is containable, provided that certain precautionary measures are observed
until the appropriate statutory reform can occur.
Part I of this Note summarizes the development of electronic
surveillance law prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act. Part II details how the Patriot Act modified preexisting law and gauges each
modification’s likely impact on privacy. Part III then identifies the Patriot Act modifications that pose the greatest threat to privacy, explains that it is impossible to consider these modifications in isolation,
and establishes that, while the Patriot Act does contain some provisions that favor privacy, these provisions are not sufficient to counter
the potential threat. Finally, this Note concludes by setting forth what
must happen if the threat to privacy is to be minimized.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LAW PRIOR
TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE PATRIOT ACT
Ever since the invention of the wiretap made electronic surveillance a reality,6 the government has justified monitoring certain
communications on the grounds that doing so is necessary to properly
investigate crime and protect national security.7 Congress eventually
decided that the conditions under which the government could conduct electronic surveillance depended on the government’s stated
objective. If the government sought evidence to be used in a criminal
8
proceeding, one body of law governed. If the government acted to

emergency exists and that there is insufficient time in which to obtain prior judicial authorization). An analysis of such a scenario, however, is outside the scope of this Note.
6. See Ira Glasser, The Struggle for a New Paradigm: Protecting Free Speech and Privacy
in the Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA L. REV. 625, 638–39 (1999) (“The wire through
which [telephone] conversations would pass, was initially thought to be . . . impenetrable. . . .
[but] [i]t was clear though that no one had anticipated wiretapping.”).
7. See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (observing that “invasions of privacy [may be construed] as necessary evils in enforcing the criminal laws . . . [and in] seek[ing] intelligence information”).
8. See infra Part I.A.
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protect national security, a related, but different, body of law ap9
plied. Terrorism, though, proved to be an “exception to the general
10
rule” because both bodies of law governed its investigation. Because
the Patriot Act was enacted in response to a terrorist attack, this Note
summarizes the development of both bodies of law.
A. Development of the Preexisting Law: Electronic Surveillance
Conducted as Part of a Criminal Investigation
The Fourth Amendment established constitutional protection for
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,”11 but, prior to 1967, the courts only applied the
Amendment’s language literally.12 For years, the seminal case was
Olmsted v. United States,13 in which the Supreme Court held that privacy was adequately protected by the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis
14
on physical trespass.
Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court decided both Berger v. New
15
16
York and Katz v. United States. In Berger, the Court characterized
as offensive any electronic surveillance that was lengthy, continuous,
17
or excessively broad. In Katz, the Supreme Court finally overruled

9. See infra Part I.B.
10. Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that terrorism is an exception to the general rule because its “primary, albeit intermediate, objective” is “mayhem and individual
harm[],” but its “ultimate objective . . . is the quintessential national security threat—an attack
on the United States as a sovereign nation”); see also Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the TwentyFirst Century Terrorist Threat Within the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37
HOUS. L. REV. 1421, 1422–23 (2000) (observing that a “‘terrorist incident . . . can be a transforming event’” that can “‘have catastrophic effects on American society beyond the [many]
deaths it might cause’” (quoting Combating Terrorism: Implementation and Status of the Department of Defense Domestic Preparedness Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l
Sec., Int’l Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight,
105th Cong. 50–51 (1998) (statement of Frank Cilluffo, Senior Analyst, Center for Strategic and
International Studies))).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Michelle Skatoff-Gee, Changing Technologies and the Expectation of Privacy: A Modern Dilemma, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 192 (1996) (noting that Fourth Amendment protections
only applied when “government agents searched or seized tangible ‘houses, papers, or effects’”).
13. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
14. Id. at 465–66.
15. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58–60 (holding that the statute was offensive because it did not
require any showing that a particular offense had been committed, that the intrusions were essentially a continuous invasion of privacy, and that the surveillance could last for an indefinite
period of time). The Berger Court also stated that electronic surveillance was inherently intru-
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Olmsted and held that wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance were subject to the privacy protections of the Fourth
18
Amendment. As Justice Harlan articulated in his concurrence, people are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection if they exhibit “an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that . . . society [could]
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”19
In response to Berger and Katz and to law enforcement’s claim
20
that wiretapping was needed to fight crime, Congress passed Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title
III).21 In enacting Title III, Congress also sought to protect privacy by
establishing uniform conditions under which electronic surveillance
22
could occur. Most importantly, Title III established that the government could only intercept the content of wire communications
23
pursuant to a court order based on a finding of probable cause. To
24
obtain authority for a roving wiretap, the government also had to
show that the surveillance target intended to “thwart interception by
25
changing facilities.” In all surveillance cases, Title III mandated that
the surveillance target have, prior to the introduction of any damaging evidence in a criminal proceeding, the opportunity to challenge
both the existence of probable cause and the conduct of the surveil-

sive because it “[swept] in all conversations within its scope—without regard to the participants
or the nature of the conversations.” Id. at 65 (noting that a single wiretap resulted in the taping
of “conversations involving, at the other end, The Julliard School of Music, Brooklyn Law
School, [and a number of other respectable institutions]”).
18. 389 U.S. at 353.
19. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 71 (1997).
21. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197,
211–25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000)).
22. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 71.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000). In addition, the government also had to show both that it
had a special need to engage in electronic surveillance, id. § 2518(3)(c), and that electronic surveillance could be carried out such that the likelihood of intercepting innocent communications
would be minimized, id. § 2518(5).
24. Roving wiretaps are “[wire]taps placed on a phone line other than the line subscribed
to by the target of a surveillance order” and are considered especially invasive “because they
often entail tapping the phone of someone who is not the subject of an investigation and not
suspected of any involvement in criminal conduct.” Dempsey, supra note 20, at 114.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (1994). This provision was later slightly altered. Now, the government only has to show that the effect of the target’s actions may be to evade interception. See 18
U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (2000) (requiring solely that the government show that “the person’s
actions could have the effect of thwarting interception”).
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26
lance. If such a challenger prevailed, any improperly obtained evidence would be statutorily excluded.27
For the next eighteen years, Title III was the only codified pro28
tection for oral and wire communications. Technology, however, in29
creasingly began to surge ahead of what statute could protect, especially where electronic communications were concerned.30 As a result,
communications were subject to “widely disparate legal treatment”
31
depending on the form of the communication. Recognizing the need
for reform, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 (ECPA)32 in an attempt “to bring [the] new technologies . . . into the statutory framework of the laws governing wire33
taps.”
ECPA extended the scope of Title III by prohibiting the unau34
thorized monitoring of electronic communications. ECPA also provided some protection for the transactional data that was generated
by communications systems by establishing rules for the use of pen

26. Id. § 2518(9)–(10)(a).
27. See id. § 2515 (stating that no improperly intercepted wire or oral communication can
be received in evidence if disclosure would be in violation of Title III); id. § 2518(10)(a) (stating
that “[a]ny aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication . . . unlawfully intercepted”). In short, this “statutory exclusionary rule provides for the
exclusion of wire or oral wiretap evidence if law enforcement violates any ‘central’ provision of
Title III, even if the violation is purely statutory and suppression is not required by Katz and
Berger.” Michael S. Leib, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic
Communication to Title III’s Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a “Good Faith”
Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 408 (1997).
28. Skatoff-Gee, supra note 12, at 201.
29. See id. (“With the advent of cellular telephones, computer-to-computer transmissions,
and electronic mail systems, technology outpaced . . . statutory protections.”).
30. See Leib, supra note 27, at 402–03 (“What was perfectly clear . . . was that Title III . . .
did not cover electronic communication.”).
31. Id. at 403 (quoting Robert W. Kastenmeir et al., Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 715, 720). As a result of this omission, business rivals could
intercept each other’s “electronic communications . . . without repercussion” and “by the mid
1980s, companies were losing millions of dollars a year to [such] ‘electronic espionage.’” Id. at
403–04.
32. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521, 2701–2709, 3121–3127 (2000)).
33. Leib, supra note 27, at 393.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2511. While it is correct to say that ECPA does not apply to ham or CB radio broadcasts, ECPA may apply to data transfers involving wireless local area networks. See
Dempsey, supra note 20, at 110 n.233 (“The status of legal protection for wireless data transfers
has a confused history, leaving it unclear whether they are currently protected.”).
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35
registers and trap and trace devices. ECPA required the government
to obtain a court order before installing either device36 unless the government only sought to obtain transactional information relating to
the target’s electronic communications, in which case a subpoena was
sufficient.37 Regardless of what Congress might have intended, however, ECPA as enacted gave less protection to electronic communica38
tion than Title III gave to wire and oral communication.
The passage of ECPA did not halt the advance of technology,
and law enforcement soon complained that the new “developments
39
were making . . . interception [of communications] more difficult.”
Congress responded by enacting the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).40 The purpose of CALEA was to
“preserve the government’s ability . . . to intercept communications
involving advanced technologies . . . while protecting the privacy of
communications and without impeding the introduction of new technologies.”41

35. “[T]he term ‘pen register’ means a device which records or decodes electronic or other
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to
which such device is attached [but does not relate to billing information].” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
“[T]he term ‘trap and trace device’ means a device which captures the incoming electronic or
other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a
wire or electronic communication was transmitted.” Id. § 3127(4). Throughout this Note, both
devices are often collectively referred to as pen/trap devices.
36. Id. § 3122(b)(2) (stating that an application for a court order must include the identity
of the government official making the request and a “certification . . . that the information likely
to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation”). The judge’s role in granting a
court order for either a pen register or a trap and trace device is purely ministerial. See id. §
3123(a) (“[T]he court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen
register or a trap and trace device . . . if the court finds that the attorney for the Government . . .
has [properly] certified [the application].” (emphasis added)). In other words, “the sole function
of the judge is to determine whether the signature of a[] [Government attorney] is on the application.” Dempsey, supra note 20, at 113.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
38. Leib, supra note 27, at 406. ECPA allowed federal officials to request interception of
electronic communications whenever they thought it would “provide . . . evidence of any Federal felony” and provided that “any government attorney” could approve such an intercept application. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (emphasis added).
39. Dempsey, supra note 20, at 89–90 (attributing the difficulties to (1) the “rapid growth
of wireless systems,” (2) an increased number of telecommunications service providers, and (3)
an expanded menu of call processing options; all of which made it increasingly harder to “isolat[e] the communication stream associated with a particular target”).
40. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat.
4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (1994 & Supp. 1999), 18 U.S.C. § 3124 (2000),
and in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 9 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489.
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In CALEA, Congress recognized that the transactional data associated with sending, receiving, and storing e-mail revealed much
42
more about the user than did the digits of a telephone number. For
this reason, Congress ceased to allow such information to be obtained
merely by means of a subpoena and began requiring a court order.43
Congress also prohibited the government from using pen/trap
authority to obtain any tracking or location information other than
that which could be determined from a telephone number.44
Between the enactment of CALEA and the passage of the Patriot Act, electronic surveillance law remained relatively unchanged
so far as criminal investigations were concerned.
B. Development of the Preexisting Law: Electronic Surveillance
Conducted in the Interests of National Security
Even though the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)45
has governed electronic surveillance conducted in the name of national security since 1978, the events that led to the statute’s enactment continue to affect debates over the appropriateness of electronic surveillance. Thus, this Note first briefly describes these events
before setting forth the relevant provisions of the statute.
1. Background to FISA. Through the early 1900s, the executive
branch was almost entirely responsible for handling intelligence matters, and Congress deferred to its judgment.46 As the world became
47
more complex, however, so too did the threats to national security.
Sadly, the American response was sometimes characterized by a tendency to “tak[e] a few isolated incidents and inflat[e] them into . . . [a]

42. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 31 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3511.
43. Id.
44. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994).
45. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (1994 & Supp. 1999), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000), 47
U.S.C. §§ 605–606 (1994 & Supp. 1999), and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1606 (1999).
46. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 17–18 (noting that “[t]his approach offended no
one, because the nature of intelligence activities rarely touched the private lives of the citizenry”).
47. See id. at 19–20 (discussing how the wiretapping of the German and Austro-Hungarian
embassies, coupled with interception of the Zimmerman telegram, created fear of domestic subversion in the United States).

HENDERSON.DOC

186

11/15/02 2:56 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:179

48
vast threat, requiring an immediate, repressive response.” One such
example occurred in 1917, when fear of German subversion caused
49
Congress to enact the Espionage Act of 1917. The resulting “[v]ague
regulations took their aim not at German spies, but at agitators, while
legions of informers, private investigators and federal agents combined to root out subversive elements.”50 Similarly, “[w]hen a spy
scare swept the nation near [the end of World War I],” the Attorney
General accepted the volunteer “assistance” of the American Protective League.51 After each volunteer was given a badge similar to a police shield, the APL conducted a zealous campaign against numerous
forms of perceived disloyalty.52
Over time, fear of Germans was gradually displaced by fear of
Bolsheviks, and raids on suspected Communists became the new
53
vogue. These raids were called “Palmer raids” after the Attorney
General who approved them, and they resulted in the arrests of numerous individuals without probable cause.54 Some people protested
the government’s actions, “but they were few and the perceived red

48. David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 252 (1996); see also Thomas I.
Emerson, Symposium: National Security and Civil Liberties: Introduction, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
685, 685–86 (1984) (“Appeals to patriotism and especially expressions of alarm about the intentions of foreign enemies have always been used as techniques for rallying political support. The
resulting tides of public opinion are likely to create a diversion from the real issues that must be
resolved.”).
49. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that the Espionage Act, which was
enacted on June 15, 1917, “authorized the government to confiscate property, wiretap, search
and seize private property, censure writings, open mail and restrict the right of assembly,” despite the fact that “[t]he specter of German subversion far surpassed reality”).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 23.
52. See id. (“Acting without police powers, volunteers conducted arrests . . . tapped telephones and conducted ‘slacker raids’ to root out draft dodgers.”).
53. See Kopel & Olson, supra note 48, at 254 (noting that raids of radical groups became
more frequent because “[a]s Communists took over Russia following the end of the war,
American fears of violent foreign radicals intensified”).
54. Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 24–25; see also ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF
MCCARTHYISM 11 (1994) (stating that the Palmer Raids “were the culmination of almost a year
of near hysteria on the part of politicians, journalists, and businesspeople who claimed that the
left wing agitation and labor unrest that had followed World War I threatened to plunge the
nation into the revolutionary chaos that they claimed was sweeping Europe”). Even though it
might have seemed like a good idea in the aftermath of the Palmer Raids, dismantling the intelligence services completely would have been a “significant error” because intelligence information would soon prove to be critical. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that, at
the time, Bolshevism, European Fascism, and “Japanese hegemonic militarism” were movements that already had begun to attract followers).
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55
threat loomed larger than life.” For this reason, and because Olmsted did nothing to restrict the use of wiretaps, the executive branch
employed electronic surveillance whenever it thought that doing so
56
was in the national interest.
In 1949, Americans learned that the Soviets possessed nuclear
57
capabilities. “By the early 1950s . . . Soviet spy rings had been uncovered in the United States, Communists had overrun China and
58
Americans were dying in Korea.” Public awareness of these events,
fanned by the diatribes of Senator Joseph McCarthy, combined to
create fear of all things perceived to be Communist.59 “Foreign threats
were targeted, but so [too] was a domestic fifth column of Americans
60
who were viewed as potential threats to the national security.” Not
surprisingly, by the mid 1950s, “J. Edgar Hoover [had] announced to
the FBI that the Bureau was authorized to enter private property for
the purpose of installing electronic surveillance devices, without regard for surreptitious entry and without prior authorization from the
Attorney General.”61 Subsequently, President Johnson “‘modified the
standard to permit warrantless wiretapping’” when it was necessary to

55. Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 25.
56. See id. at 26–30 (describing the expanding scope and use of electronic surveillance employed between the 1930s and the 1950s). Beginning in 1931, each Attorney General endorsed
the use of wiretaps in certain cases. William P. Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J.
792, 794 (1954). Then, in 1940, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson stated that the Department
of Justice would no longer use wiretaps or handle cases for other agencies in which wiretaps had
been used. Id. at 795. This change proved to be only temporary. Shortly thereafter, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to Jackson and “authorized the use of wiretapping in [national]
security cases provided in each case [that] the Attorney General gave his specific approval.” Id.
at 795 n.15. In 1941, President Roosevelt wrote to the House Judiciary Committee to state that
it was sometimes necessary to conduct wiretapping to protect the national security of the country. Id. at 796.
57. RICHARD POLENBERG, ONE NATION DIVISIBLE: CLASS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1938, at 97 (1980). The announcement that the Soviets possessed
nuclear capability “unleashed a torrent of anxiety and finger-pointing as both policymakers and
private citizens struggled to come to terms with these staggering blows to America’s selfconfidence and preeminence in the world.” SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 32.
58. Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 29.
59. See, e.g., POLENBERG, supra note 57, at 126 (stating that “McCarthyism sanctioned vicious smear campaigns, created harmful pressures for conformity, and rode roughshod over individual rights, all of which was antithetical to American ideals, if not atypical of American
practices”).
60. Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 30.
61. Id. at 28.
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62
protect national security. On the surface, the Nixon administration
claimed to take the same approach. In reality, though, “the President’s men . . . claimed unprecedented authority to conduct electronic
63
surveillance,” “us[ing] wiretaps to investigate [both] news leaks” and
political opponents.64
By the early 1970s, the political climate had begun to shift for
several reasons. First, the American public had had time to get used
to Katz, and even though the Katz Court did not consider the na65
tional security aspect of electronic surveillance, the opinion arguably
helped cement into the public consciousness the idea that privacy was
an essential element of democracy. Second, in United States v. United
66
67
States District Court (Keith ), the Supreme Court finally answered
the question it had left unanswered in Katz and held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited warrantless surveillance that targeted domestic threats to national security.68 Third, Americans gradually began to
realize that their government had monitored many of them without
69
70
their knowledge, and this realization made many of them angry.

62. Gerald F. Reimers II, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. 55,
63 (2000) (quoting Steven Saltzburg, National Security and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1001, 1019 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990)).
63. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 258 (1974).
64. See id. at 313 (noting that, between 1969 and 1971, the Nixon administration tapped the
telephones of both government officials and reporters).
65. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967) (“Whether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.”).
66. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
67. This case came to be known as Keith because Judge Damon J. Keith was the federal
district judge that heard the case. Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1384 n.20
(1993).
68. 407 U.S. at 320. Ironically, Keith was decided two days after the Watergate arrests.
BERNSTEIN & WOODWARD, supra note 63, at 258.
69. For example, “the NSA was known to have conducted an extensive monitoring program under the code name Shamrock through which the agency received copies of most international telegrams leaving the United States between 1945 and 1975.” Eric M. Freedman, Freedom
of Information and the First Amendment in a Bureaucratic Age, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 841
n.16 (1983). Further, since “a Senate Committee conducted a full investigation of the interception program and prepared a detailed report that was later read into the record,” nothing remained secret about the operation. Id.; see also Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 31 (noting
that surveillance operations like Operation Shamrock “came to an end only when congressional
interest in intelligence activities began to focus on privacy issues” and were only disclosed when
“public hearings [became] a certainty”). Also, Title III required the government to keep track
of its wiretapping activities and disseminate the resulting information in report format. 18
U.S.C. § 2519 (2000). The data that the government collected certainly seems like it would have
focused the public’s attention. See Glasser, supra note 6, at 642 (“In the first four years after the
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Fourth, oversight committees began to criticize the intelligence com71
munity for the methods it had used. These committees did not have
an immediate impact, but they did create a “first-time focus on the
72
President’s authority for national security surveillance.” Most significantly though, the publication of the Pentagon Papers and the
coverage of the Watergate scandal caused many people to question
73
the authority claimed by the executive branch.
2. FISA. In Keith, Justice Powell had invited Congress to regu74
late domestic security surveillance. In 1978, Congress accepted Justice Powell’s invitation and enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-

1968 bill was passed, 1.1 million conversations were overheard, 93,080 people were spied upon,
6131 people were arrested and a total of 1154 people were reported convicted—barely more
than one percent.”).
70. People had good reason to be angry. The newspapers had published stories of how dissident groups in the United States had been the targets of electronic surveillance, break-ins, and
mail openings. Reimers, supra note 62, at 64. Worse yet, “‘[a]dditional disclosures began to surface in [the mid 1970s] with regard to the CIA’s domestic operations and the efforts of the FBI
to undermine the activities of Rev. Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders during the
1960s.’” Id. (quoting Daniel B. Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 913, 920 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990)).
71. The Rockefeller Commission, which had been created by President Ford, found that if
the CIA’s purpose was “‘the prosecution of crimes or protection against civil disorders of domestic insurrection, then the activity [usually should have been] prohibited.’” Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 33 (quoting COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 62 (1975)). Similarly, the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, which was known as the Church
Committee, found “multiple shortcomings in intelligence operations, adverse effects of secrecy,
failure by Congress to oversee intelligence activities, and in some cases, seemingly unlawful actions.” Id. (footnotes omitted). The Church Committee ultimately “determined that secret government activities, while necessary to the effectiveness of government, were, nevertheless, a
threat to democratic society” and that “[t]he remedy . . . was to have Congress prescribe rules
for intelligence activities.” Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. (stating that “it was only natural that with new awarenesses, the public began to
challenge intelligence activities as never before”); DAVID W. LEVY, THE DEBATE OVER
VIETNAM 162 (1991):
Perhaps as damning in the eyes of the public as the content of the [Pentagon] papers
was the unseemly way that the Nixon administration scrambled to prevent their publication. By the time the Supreme Court decided that they could be printed, many
Americans . . . were perfectly certain that they must contain some pretty damaging information.
74. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972) (“Given [the] potential
distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security,
Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.”).
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75
lance Act (FISA). The legislative history established that Congress
was in large part responding to the “revelations that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security [had] been seri76
ously abused.” At the same time, Congress also realized that
“[s]afeguarding national security . . . [was] a vitally important Government purpose,” and that it was legislating in a “dangerous world”
77
containing any number of “hostile intelligence activities.” For these
reasons, Congress chose to limit, as opposed to completely eliminate,
the ability of the executive branch to conduct electronic surveillance
for national security purposes.78
Congress accomplished this objective by requiring federal officers to submit to judicial supervision of their domestic security surveillance activities. Specifically, FISA established a special court (the
FISA Court) to review applications requesting electronic surveillance.79 In all cases, applications had to be submitted by a federal officer, approved by the Attorney General,80 and descriptive of the in81
tended target. Applications also had to establish probable cause that
the target was either a foreign power82 or the agent of a foreign

75. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (1994 & Supp. 1999), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000), 47
U.S.C. §§ 605–606 (1994 & Supp. 1999), and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1606 (1999).
76. S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908
(“[While] [t]he Federal Government has never enacted legislation to regulate the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes . . . the Executive
Branch and the Congress [recognize] that the statutory rule of law must prevail.”).
77. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3910.
78. See id.:
[T]he Executive Branch of Government should have, under proper circumstances and
with appropriate safeguards, authority to acquire important foreign intelligence information by means of electronic surveillance. The committee also believes that the
past record and the state of the law in the area make it desirable that the Executive
Branch not be the sole or final arbiter of when such proper circumstances exist.
[FISA] is designed to permit the Government to gather necessary foreign intelligence
information by means of electronic surveillance but under limitations and according
to procedural guidelines which will better safeguard the rights of individuals.
79. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1994). This special court consists of seven federal district judges,
each from a different district. Id. Decisions of the court can be appealed to a designated threejudge panel and then to the Supreme Court. Id. § 1803(b). Provided that an application complies
with FISA, the reviewing judge shall issue the order. Id. § 1805(a). “Under Title III, by contrast,
a judge retains discretion to reject an application . . . even if he determines that probable cause
exists.” Dawson, supra note 67, at 1393 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1994)).
80. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a).
81. Id. § 1804(a)(3).
82. Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A). A “foreign power” is defined as a “foreign government . . .
whether or not recognized by the United States,” an entity controlled by a foreign government,
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83
power, and that “each of [the locations at which surveillance was to
be conducted was] being used, or [was] about to be used, by a foreign
84
power or an agent of a foreign power.”
85
If the target was a foreign power, the application had to contain
a certification that (1) the information sought was foreign intelligence
86
information, (2) the purpose of the surveillance was to obtain such
information, and (3) the information could not be obtained by normal
87
investigative techniques. In addition, the application had to both describe the proposed minimization procedures88 and state the “period

or “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore.” Id. §
1801(a)(1)–(6). International terrorism is defined as “activities that involve . . . acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States [and that] appear to be
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population . . . [or] government, [the consequences of
which] transcend national boundaries.” Id. § 1801(c).
83. Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A). An “agent of a foreign power” is defined as any person other than
a United States person who acts in the United States as an officer, employee, or member of a
foreign power or who “engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States.” Id. § 1801(b) (emphasis added).
Section 1801(i) defines a U.S. person as being one of the following: (1) a U.S. citizen, (2)
an alien lawfully residing permanently in the United States, (3) an unincorporated association
that is not a foreign power and that has a substantial number of members that satisfy either (1)
or (2), or (4) a corporation that is not a foreign power and is incorporated in the United States.
Throughout this Note, the phrases “U.S person” and “non U.S person” are used to denote
whether entities meet the preceding definition.
An “agent of a foreign power” is also defined as “any person who knowingly engages in
clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power [and whose] activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States” or any
person who “knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism” or who “knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power” or who “knowingly conspires with any person to engage in [any of the activities described above].” Id. § 1801(b) (Supp.
V 1999) (emphasis added). That said, “no United States person may be considered a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (1994). Note that,
“unlike in Title III, the Executive does not have to demonstrate that the target’s activity will, or
may, result in a specific criminal violation. FISA allows a surveillance application to be approved upon [the lower standard] that a person’s activities ‘may involve’ criminal ‘activity.’”
Dawson, supra note 67, at 1393.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(B).
85. Id. § 1804(b) (stating that applications targeting foreign powers need not “contain the
information required by paragraphs (6), (7)(E), (8) and (11) of subsection (a) of this section”).
86. The definition of “foreign intelligence information” depends on whether the target is a
U.S. person. Id. § 1801(e)(1). If a surveillance target is a U.S. person, “foreign intelligence information” is information that is “necessary” for the government to obtain to protect national
security. Id. § 1801(e). If a target is not a U.S. person, information is “foreign intelligence information” so long as it just “relates” to national security. Id.
87. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(A)–(D).
88. Id. § 1804(a)(5).
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89
of time for which the electronic surveillance [was] required.” If the
target was an agent of a foreign power, then the application had to be
90
even more detailed.
Information obtained under FISA’s provisions could be disclosed
for law enforcement purposes only if either the information was to be
used in a criminal proceeding and the Attorney General had given
91
advance authorization, or if the government could establish that intelligence gathering had been the “primary purpose” of the surveil92
lance. Prior to the introduction of any such information as evidence,
the government had to give reasonable notice to the defendant that
93
he or she was the target of FISA surveillance. The defendant could
then move to suppress the evidence on the ground that the “surveillance was not lawfully authorized or conducted.”94 If the Attorney
General filed an affidavit stating that disclosure would “harm the national security of the United States,” the district court had to review
the application, order, and related materials “in camera and ex parte”
95
to determine whether the surveillance was lawful. The court was
only required to disclose to the defendant such portions of the surveillance materials necessary “to make an accurate determination of
the legality of surveillance.”96

89. Id. § 1804(a)(10). In the case of a foreign power, an application also must summarize
the likely impact of the surveillance on U.S. persons so that the court can properly “assess the
proposed minimization procedures.” Id. § 1804(b).
90. If the target was an agent of a foreign power, the application had to satisfy several additional requirements. First, the application had to describe the nature of the information sought
and the type of communications that would be subjected to surveillance. Id. § 1804(a)(6). Second, it had to establish the government’s basis for concluding that the information sought was
“the type of foreign intelligence information designated” and that it could not be obtained by
normal investigative techniques. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E). Third, the application had to describe how
the surveillance would be conducted. Id. § 1804(a)(8). Finally, if more than one surveillance device was to be used, the application had to specify the minimization procedures that would apply
to each device. Id. § 1804(a)(11).
91. Id. § 1806(b).
92. E.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the evidence gathered was admissible because the primary purpose for collecting it was to gather foreign intelligence information); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (same);
Reimers, supra note 62, at 91–94 (discussing various tests for determining the “primary purpose” of government surveillance); see also United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th
Cir. 1987) (finding no merit to petitioner’s contention that “he [was] entitled to suppression
simply because evidence of his criminal conduct was discovered incidentally as the result of an
intelligence surveillance”).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c).
94. Id. § 1806(g).
95. Id. § 1806(f).
96. Id.
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In the more than twenty years that have passed since FISA was
97
enacted, only two applications have been rejected. Moreover, while
the Supreme Court has never considered whether the balance struck
by FISA is constitutional, the lower courts have repeatedly “upheld
FISA’s constitutionality from just about every angle of attack.”98
In 1998, Congress amended FISA to permit the use of pen/trap
99
devices in intelligence-related surveillance. Otherwise though, the
electronic surveillance provisions in FISA remained essentially the
same until the Patriot Act was enacted.

97. STEVEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 696 (3d ed. 2002).
98. Reimers, supra note 62, at 77–78 (stating that FISA fulfills both the “reasonable” and
“warrant” requirements of the Fourth Amendment); see also Dawson, supra note 67, at 1395–96
(“The view expressed by the Second Circuit in United States v. Duggan is representative: ‘We
regard the procedures fashioned in FISA as a constitutionally adequate balancing of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against the nation’s need to obtain foreign intelligence information.’” (quoting Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984))).
From 1978 “[t]hrough 1987, the FISA Court . . . reviewed over 4000 government applications for approval of electronic surveillance. Only one was rejected. In addition, ‘no court that
[was] required to determine the legality of a FISA surveillance under 1806(f) . . . found disclosure or an adversary hearing necessary.’” Dawson, supra note 67, at 1396–97 (“It is possible to
draw divergent conclusions from this data. One could infer that the extensive FISA safeguards
have forced the Executive to self-censor its requests. One could also argue, however, that the
courts act merely as a ‘rubber stamp’ whenever the Executive invokes national security.”).
99. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601, 112
Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. 1999)). The relevant provision provided that the government had to “demonstrate” that the device to be monitored had
been, or was about to be, used in activities that “involve[d] or [might] involve a violation of the
criminal laws.” Id.; see also Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 80 (observing that the FISA
standard required “more of the [government] than the traditional criminal law enforcement rule
for using the same surveillance techniques”).
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II. THE PATRIOT ACT MODIFIED PREEXISTING ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE LAW IN FIVE SIGNIFICANT WAYS100
A. When Trying to Obtain an Intercept Order, It May Now Be Easier
to Use FISA to Circumvent Title III.
In the past, a common question that frequently arose where
FISA was concerned was “whether [the statute], which naturally
would be utilized to obtain ‘foreign intelligence’ information regarding terrorists and spies, [could] be used to identify and criminally convict those same terrorists and spies.”101 The statute itself established
one method by which this could be done: information obtained under
FISA’s provisions could be disclosed for law enforcement purposes if
the information was to be used in a criminal proceeding, and if the
102
Attorney General had given advance authorization. The question
still remained though because it was hard, at the beginning of, say, a
domestic terrorist investigation, for the government to know how
close it actually was to being able to go to trial.103 Prosecution of the
surveillance target might seem only to be a distant dream, and the
government might not have enough evidence to obtain a Title III intercept order.104 The courts responded to this situation by allowing
evidence to be used in criminal trials that was discovered “inciden-

100. Some of the Patriot Act modifications raise only minor concerns because the magnitude of the modification is minimal. For example, the Patriot Act adds terrorist acts to the list of
crimes for which a Title III wiretap is obtainable. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 201, 115
Stat. 272, 278 (2001). Since the list of predicate crimes already included offenses such as murder,
kidnapping, and “crime dangerous to life, limb or property,” 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1994), this
modification is likely to have little effect. Similarly, neither changing the maximum period for
which FISA surveillance (of a non-U.S. person) can be approved by thirty days, Patriot Act §
207, 115 Stat. at 282, nor increasing the number of FISA judges to eleven, id. § 208, 115 Stat. at
282, is that consequential either.
101. Sievert, supra note 10, at 1437–38.
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) (1994).
103. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972):
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many
types of crime specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence
gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government’s preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus
of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime.
104. Sievert, supra note 10, at 1438 (noting that it may be hard to show that there is “probable cause to believe that a particular individual will be using a specific communication device
to further known criminal activity”).
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105
tally” to FISA surveillance. That is, information obtained pursuant
to FISA could be used in criminal proceedings provided that intelli106
gence gathering was the “primary purpose” of the surveillance.
The Patriot Act altered the “primary purpose” requirement, and
FISA surveillance requests no longer have to establish that intelli107
gence gathering is “the” purpose of the surveillance. All that is required now is that intelligence gathering be a “significant” purpose.108
This modification has been criticized because it makes it easier
for the government to skirt what are supposed to be limitations on
109
permissible domestic surveillance. Some commentators have gone
so far as to characterize the blurring between Title III and FISA as
“tear[ing] down legal fire walls erected 25 years ago during the Watergate era, when the nation was stunned by disclosures about presidential abuses of domestic intelligence gathering.”110 In short, the concern is that the government might use its newly expanded authority
with insufficient discretion.
Some of this criticism may be excessive, especially given that a
suspect in the September 11 attacks may have escaped prior detection
due to a primary purpose concern.111 Moreover, the United States had

105. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075–76 (4th Cir. 1987) (allowing evidence collected by FISA authorized surveillance to be used in a criminal proceeding because the
primary purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information); United
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that information obtained under FISA
is admissible even where “the government [could actually] anticipate that the fruits of [FISA]
surveillance [might] later be used . . . as evidence in a criminal trial”).
107. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
108. Id.
109. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 97, at 690 (questioning whether the FBI is “now permitted to conduct a secret search or wiretap for the primary purpose of investigating a crime even
though there is no probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime”); American Civil Liberties Union, USA Patriot Act Boosts Government Powers While Cutting Back on Traditional
Checks and Balances, at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l110101a.html (Nov. 1, 2001) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“This provision authorizes unconstitutional physical searches and wiretaps . . . without probable cause of crime.”).
110. Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring
Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4; see also Jeffrey
Toobin, Crackdown: Should We Be Worried About the New Antiterrorism Legislation?, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 57:
The [Patriot Act] . . . breaks down Cold War-era barriers between foreign intelligence
and domestic law enforcement to an unprecedented degree. The Justice Department
and other agencies will be permitted to move faster, probe deeper, and strike harder
at those suspected of terrorist activities. The corresponding worry is whether these
changes will . . . raise the level of fear that citizens feel toward their own government.
111.

See David Johnston & Philip Shenron, FBI Curbed Scrutiny of Man Now a Suspect in
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just experienced an attack unprecedented in its magnitude, and national security was threatened. In enacting section 218 of the Patriot
Act, Congress was in effect saying that wiretaps should be approved
whenever law enforcement, subject to judicial supervision, can establish that a threat to national security exists. Perhaps there was a better
way whereby Congress could have maintained the old standards and
still ensured that federal agencies would be able to investigate terrorism as needed, but there is no indication that any such solution was
then apparent.
In addition, electronic surveillance law today is far removed in
many respects from what it was during the Watergate era. Before Watergate, the executive branch essentially just monitored people when112
ever it thought that doing so was in the national interest. Since
FISA was enacted, however, government agencies investigating national security threats have had to submit to judicial supervision of
their domestic security surveillance activities.113 The Patriot Act did
not change the fact that, if the executive branch cannot satisfy the
threshold requirements, the designated judge will refuse to authorize
surveillance.114 Granted, what can happen to the information once it
has been obtained has changed, but this is not the same thing as the
complete absence of judicial involvement.
Still, the statute can be improved. Executive power needs to be
checked by that of another branch. Ideally, Congress would make this
115
expressly clear in the statute. Until then, however, judges must hold
that their giving substantive meaning to “significant” is necessarily
implied when they decide whether to admit information obtained
the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A1 (stating that the FBI refrained from criminally investigating Zacarias Moussauoui after learning that Moussauoui had stated that he wanted to
learn to fly jets but had no interest in landing them, on the ground that starting a criminal investigation might make it difficult to later obtain approval for covert FISA surveillance).
112. See supra Part I.B.1.
113. See supra notes 79–90 and accompanying text.
114. See supra Part I.B.2. More specifically, none of the FISA information that could conceivably be used to convict an individual can be obtained from the individual without initial judicial approval of the government’s claim that there is a threat to national security. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
115. Congress has shown some indication of being dissatisfied, at least in part, with what it
created. The House Judiciary Committee has ordered the Department of Justice to respond to a
set of written questions by September of 2002. Steve Schultze, Sensenbrenner Wants Answers on
Act; He Threatens to Subpoena Ashcroft to Get Details on Patriot Act, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 2002, at 7A. The written questions ask the Department of Justice both to
clarify the extent of the electronic surveillance it has conducted pursuant to the Patriot Act and
explain what protections are in place to protect constitutional freedoms. Id.
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116
from FISA in a criminal proceeding. Independent judicial authority
would then subtly check executive power, which is all that FISA was
ever intended to accomplish. The executive branch would still be able
to protect national security, but people in the United States could be
more certain that what is being investigated is actually a national security threat.

B. FISA Courts Can Now Authorize Roving Surveillance.
Before the Patriot Act was enacted, roving wiretaps were only
available in the law enforcement context, and, to obtain one, the government had to show that the target was actually using the line to be
tapped.117 The Patriot Act changed this. The government now has the
power to engage in roving surveillance118 in the intelligence context as
well (i.e., pursuant to FISA), but it no longer has the corresponding
obligation to demonstrate that the target actually uses the device to
be tapped.119
120
Roving surveillance is highly invasive, and, not surprisingly, this
modification has been resoundingly criticized by privacy advocates.
More specifically, this modification has been characterized as a
“broad expansion of power” that does not build in “a necessary privacy protection,” with the risk that innocent users could have their
121
privacy invaded. For example, if a terrorist “us[ed] the Internet
116. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA Patriot
Act That Relate to Online Activities, at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_ militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.html (Oct. 31, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(stating that if the antiterrorism laws are either “misused to spy on innocent people” or “misused to harm the rights of ordinary Americans involved in low level crimes unrelated to terrorism,” the courts should both punish those responsible and exclude any evidence collected as a
result).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(12) (2000).
118. Roving surveillance occurs when the government continuously monitors multiple
communications devices pursuant to the same intercept order. United States v. Hermanek, 289
F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002); Dempsey, supra note 20, at 114.
119. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282 (2001) (stating that the
government must show that the target is likely to “thwart” surveillance that focuses on monitoring a single device); Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 116 (noting that federal
agents “can now go from phone to phone, computer to computer without demonstrating that
each is even being used by a suspect or target of an order”).
120. See Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of Roving Surveillance,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 416 (noting that “persons speaking with the target . . . are exposed to
initial intrusion without a showing of probable cause”).
121. American Civil Liberties Union, How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Limits Judicial Oversight
of Telephone and Internet Surveillance, at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l102301g.html (Oct. 23,
2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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connection at a public library and law enforcement was using a FISA
wiretap order to monitor his or her Internet communications, [law enforcement] might continue to monitor all Internet communications at
that site [even] after the terrorist [had] left and was no longer using
122
the computer.”
Granted, this modification worked a significant change in the
preexisting law, but Fourth Amendment limits on government
authority are most likely not exceeded, because the threat to privacy
described above appears to be outweighed by the government’s duty
123
to protect national security. Several observations are particularly
relevant. First, roving surveillance has already been upheld as consti124
tutional in the law enforcement context. Second, terrorists are likely
to become, if they are not already, sophisticated enough to avoid non125
roving surveillance. Third, the government may have the capacity to
obtain useful information as a result of being able to monitor individuals suspected of posing a threat to the United States.126 Fourth,
the threat to privacy is limited in time, since the section of the Patriot
127
Act that authorizes roving FISA surveillance will sunset in 2005.
Although it seems that the benefits to allowing roving surveillance in the FISA context outweigh the burdens, the statute could be
improved. More specifically, the privacy concern could be minimized
if additional judicial involvement were mandated. At present, the
122. Id.
123. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (establishing the relevant test).
124. While the Supreme Court has not decided whether roving wiretaps violate the Fourth
Amendment, several lower courts have upheld their use. United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d
1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 553 (5th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir. 1993).
125. Part of the reason law enforcement supported making roving surveillance possible under Title III was that criminals had become increasingly sophisticated about detecting possible
surveillance. Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1087 (noting that roving surveillance enabled law enforcement to cope with cellular technology); see also Goldsmith, supra note 120, at 410 (“The success
of electronic surveillance prompted experienced targets to shift telephones continuously, carefully guard conspiratorial meeting sites, and frequently change the locations of meetings.”). If
this was true of criminals in general, it almost certainly seems like it would be true of people
who threaten national security as well. As Senator Orrin Hatch noted, “Terrorists . . . don’t pay
any attention to . . . antiquated laws. They just buy 10 cell phones, talk for a while, [and then
discard them as needed].” Adam Clymer, A Nation Challenged: The Legislation; Antiterrorism
Bill Passes; U.S. Gets Expanded Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at A1.
126. See Goldsmith, supra note 120, at 410 (noting that past surveillance operations indicate
that some targets engage in “pertinent discussions on a continuous basis—regardless of location”).
127. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001).
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judge is not required to monitor roving FISA surveillance. If federal
agents were required to report back to the authorizing judge periodically, there would be less chance that the executive branch could
abuse the authority with which it has been entrusted, as there would
be a greater degree of independent review present. Since the procedural burden on the government would not be excessive, it makes
sense to improve the statute in this way.
C. The Standard Under Which FISA Pen/Trap Orders Can Be
Obtained Is Now Lower.
To obtain a FISA order authorizing the use of a pen/trap device,
the government now only has to certify that the information sought is
relevant to an ongoing intelligence or terrorism investigation.128 In the
past, the government also had to demonstrate that the device to be
monitored was likely to be used by someone involved in terrorism or
intelligence activities that could violate U.S. criminal laws.129 Ironically, the old FISA standard required more of the government than
130
did the corresponding Title III provision. The Patriot Act thus had
the effect of setting virtually the same standard for FISA that existed
131
for Title III.
By making it easier for the government to obtain a FISA
pen/trap order, Congress increased the likelihood that American citi132
zens will be subject to increased FISA pen/trap surveillance. While
this modification represents a marked change from preexisting law, it
does not seem that the consequences will be that severe. Obtaining a
pen/trap order under Title III has always been so easy to do,133 that it
128. Id. § 214, 115 Stat. at 286.
129. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601, 112
Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (1994 & Supp. 1999)).
130. Banks & Bowman, supra note 7, at 80.
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2000) (requiring that an application for a Title III court order approving pen/trap surveillance certify “that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation”).
132. Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 116.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) provides that “the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing
the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device . . . if the court finds that the
attorney for the Government . . . has [properly] certified [the application].” (Emphasis added.)
Consequently, the court’s role has been purely ministerial. United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d
1314, 1320–21 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir.
1990) (stating that the judicial role should be limited); In re Application of the United States for
an Order Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1558–59
(M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that the court’s role with respect to trap and trace devices is limited to
confirming: (1) the identity of the applicant and investigating agency, and (2) that the applicant
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seems unlikely that the government was ever unable to obtain a
pen/trap order when it sought to do so. Thus, any additional intrusion
on privacy that occurs as a result of this modification will probably
not be nearly invasive enough to be considered much of a threat.
Even if it were, however, the additional intrusion would hopefully be
offset by an increased ability to protect national security.
In addition, making it easier to conduct pen/trap surveillance under FISA may result in the government having to seek fewer intercept orders. This could happen if the government had cause to suspect a person of terrorist-related activity but was not yet ready to
obtain a FISA intercept order. In such a case, the government could
conduct pen/trap surveillance, and if the surveillance yielded nothing
suspicious and if no further information could be developed, the government might conclude that its suspicions had been misplaced, and
end the investigation. If pen/trap surveillance were not a ready option, the tendency might instead be to simply obtain a FISA intercept
order. Because intercepting the content of communications is much
more invasive than monitoring transactional information, this modification may have the effect of permitting an increased number of minor intrusions, but sometimes rendering unnecessary intrusions that
would be much more invasive.
D. Pen/Trap Orders Now Apply to Both Wire and Electronic
Communications.
Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act, there was an ongoing
debate as to whether the pen/trap statutes applied only to wire communications or to both wire and electronic (e.g., Internet) communi134
cations. At issue was whether transactional information inherent to

has certified that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing investigation). Moreover, the
available data indicates that the government has an almost perfect record for obtaining FISA
intercept orders when it applies for them. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
134. When Congress enacted the relevant provision of the original pen/trap statutes codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), it did not anticipate the “dramatic expansion in electronic communications that would [follow].” COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIELD GUIDANCE ON NEW AUTHORITIES THAT RELATE TO COMPUTER
CRIME AND ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE ENACTED IN THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/PatriotAct.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2001) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter FIELD GUIDANCE]. “Thus, the statute contained certain language that appeared to apply to telephone communications and that did not unambiguously encompass communications over computer networks. . . . [C]ertain . . . litigants . . . challenged the application of [the ECPA] to . . . electronic communications based on the statute’s
telephone-specific language.” Id.
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communicating electronically was more revealing than the digits di135
aled on a telephone. The Patriot Act resolved this ongoing debate
by clarifying that the pen/trap statutes apply to both types of commu136
nications, so long as content information is excluded. Because a
number of courts had in effect already reached this same conclu137
sion, this modification is unlikely to entail any significant substantive consequences other than making explicit that which was previously assumed.
Moreover, it is possible to view this modification as not unduly
intruding on privacy, because using pen/trap orders to obtain noncontent information relating to electronic communications is often less
intrusive than using pen/trap orders to monitor telephone numbers
138
dialed. Ever since ECPA became law in 1986, the use of pen/trap

135. “‘The Internet is what is known as a packet-switched network,’” which means that
“‘there is no single, unbroken connection between sender and receiver,’” and thus, “‘when information is sent, it is broken into small packets, sent over many different routes at the same
time, and then reassembled at the receiving end.’” Paul Taylor, Issues Raised by the Application
of Pen Register Statutes to Authorize Government Collection of Information on Packet-Switched
Networks, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 13 (2001), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a04Taylor.html (emphasis omitted) (quoting PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 13
(1999)). Content information is defined as “any information concerning the substance, purport,
or meaning of [a] communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510, and the “packet-switched’ nature of Internet communications has made it difficult to separate content from noncontent because “call
routing information and content are both contained in the packets.” Taylor, supra, ¶ 25. Thus,
monitoring Internet communications pursuant to an order permitting a pen register or a trap
and trace device is inherently problematic because it is possible for “the government to thereby
obtain “‘both call identifying information and call content.’” Id. ¶ 25. Such an occurrence is expressly disfavored by 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c), which states that the government should take all
technologically reasonable precautions to avoid obtaining call content. As of early 2001, “[t]he
breadth of information that the government [could] obtain from Internet networks [pursuant] to
the Pen Register [laws was] unclear.” Taylor, supra, ¶¶ 7–10.
136. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288–290 (2001). The words in both
the subject line and the body of an e-mail are considered “content” information. FIELD
GUIDANCE, supra note 134.
137. See FIELD GUIDANCE, supra note 134 (stating that, even though no federal court has
ever explicitly ruled whether the pen/trap statutes are applicable, “numerous courts . . . have
applied the [statutes] to communications on computer networks [anyway]”).
138. For example, many people who use e-mail probably do not use their real names in their
e-mail address. Both nicknames and fanciful monikers are common. In contrast, many people
who own a telephone are listed by their real name in the telephone book. If the government
were monitoring recipients of targeted communications under the new pen/trap laws, and obtained routing information pertaining to both electronic and wire communications, it would take
a little more work and authorization to discover the identity of the electronic recipient. Granted,
the government might be able to learn something about the content of an e-mail from the subject line, but the government could also guess at the content of a telephone call from knowing
the locations of the caller and the callee. Thus, it is possible that using pen/trap authority to ac-
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orders in the latter context has been a well-established facet of elec139
tronic surveillance law. Thus, it seems that in enacting this provision
of the Patriot Act, Congress was merely updating the pen/trap statutes after becoming aware of how technology had evolved. Also, in a
purely procedural sense, this modification improved preexisting law
by establishing uniform rules (i.e., rules not dependent on the type of
communication device being utilized) for obtaining and using
pen/trap orders.
E. Once Obtained, All Pen/Trap Orders Are Now Valid Throughout
the United States.
Previously, a pen/trap order was only valid in the district where it
was obtained.140 If the surveillance target moved to a different district,
the government had to obtain a second pen/trap order from the new
district. The Patriot Act changed this. Now, once a pen/trap order is
obtained, it is valid throughout the United States.141
Privacy advocates have criticized this modification, claiming that
the change is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement
142
that a warrant specify the place to be searched. Even if this were
true, it is not clear that a federal district is sufficiently more specific
than the entire country. Consequently, the logical conclusion would
seem to be that, on this particular measure at least, things are no
worse from a privacy perspective after the Patriot Act than they were
before it. In addition, this modification does not represent a significant change to the preexisting statutory law. The role of the judge in
approving a pen/trap order was always purely ministerial,143 and the
impact of the modification is solely that it is now procedurally easier
for the government to conduct pen/trap surveillance.

quire noncontent information pertaining to e-mail may be less invasive than using the same
authority in the traditional manner.
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
141. Patriot Act § 216, 115 Stat. at 288–90.
142. American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 109.
143. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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III. ASSESSING THE THREAT TO PRIVACY
A. Some Modifications Potentially Threaten Privacy More than Do
the Others.
While each of the Patriot Act modifications discussed in Part II
may threaten privacy, not all the potential threats are of equal magnitude. Thus, if the total threat is to be efficiently minimized, it is necessary to be very specific about which modifications pose the greatest
threat. Quite simply, some of the Patriot Act modifications are likely
to be of little consequence so far as privacy is concerned. For example, Congress’s creation of universal pen/trap jurisdiction eliminates
what was a purely procedural hurdle. Similarly, Congress’s decision to
have pen/trap orders apply to both wire and electronic communications formalizes the conclusion already reached by the courts. In effect, Congress merely updated the statute to account for a changing
understanding of technology, and these provisions very well could
have been enacted even if the September 11 attacks had not oc144
curred. This possibility is less true of the provision that makes it
easier to conduct pen/trap surveillance pursuant to FISA. Still, the
degree of intrusion is not great enough to warrant serious concern.
Americans, however, should be greatly concerned about the effects of the two remaining provisions. First and foremost, facilitating
the use of FISA to circumvent Title III intercept order requirements
potentially puts nonterrorists at risk of being investigated and prosecuted as terrorists. Second, allowing roving surveillance to be conducted pursuant to FISA may result in the interception of numerous
innocent conversations, many of which will involve U.S. persons.
As a matter of general policy, the problem with these last two
modifications is that, even though they probably satisfy Fourth
Amendment scrutiny on their face, too much has been left to executive branch discretion.
B. Americans Have Three Additional Reasons to be Concerned
About the Threat to Privacy.
1. Synergistic Effects May Be Present. The common theme that
emerges after analyzing each of the modifications discussed in Part II

144.

See supra Part I.A.

HENDERSON.DOC

204

11/15/02 2:56 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:179
145

is that the Patriot Act may unnecessarily threaten civil liberties.
Almost all of these criticisms reduce to fear that the government will
be able to intrude increasingly on the privacy of American citizens.
Ultimately, whether the government is unduly intruding is a question
of reasonableness. Reasonableness, however, can be an elusive con146
cept, especially because no provision of the Act can be truly evaluated solely on its own merits. It is probable that, when considered en
masse, the assorted provisions of the Patriot Act147 exhibit a synergy
that is not otherwise apparent. While such macroanalysis is beyond
the scope of this Note, the concerns raised in Parts II and III may be
even more valid when they are evaluated as part of the Patriot Act’s
impact on American society in general.
2. The Patriot Act Enables Government Agencies to Share Sensitive Information with One Another to a Much Greater Extent than
Was Previously Possible. Any government law enforcement officer or
attorney can now disclose the contents of intercepted communications to other federal officers “to the extent that such contents include foreign intelligence . . . information” that will assist the receiv148
ing officer “in the performance of . . . official duties.” Similarly, any
145. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 116 (stating that the Patriot Act was a
“tremendous blow” to the “civil liberties of ordinary Americans”). Some commentators have
also expressed concern that antiterrorist zeal, no matter how well intentioned, might impact individuals or activities that are not really terrorist related. See, e.g., Morton H. Halperin, Protecting Civil Liberties at a Time of Crisis, Center for Democracy & Technology, at
http://www.cdt.org/security/011025halperin.shtml (Oct. 25, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (criticizing the Patriot Act as overly broad).
146. Polls are not necessarily helpful because any data revealed can quickly shift. “After the
bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995,” 49 percent of the people polled by one
newspaper stated that they thought giving up “some civil liberties [would be necessary] to curb
terrorism.” Lisa Guernsey, Living Under an Electronic Eye, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at G1.
When the same question was asked in 1997 using the same methodology, “that figure had
dropped to 29 percent.” Id. When the question was again asked shortly after the September
11th attacks, the figure shot up to 79 percent. Id. Congressional support is not necessarily revealing either, because sometimes legislators perceive that they cannot afford to oppose certain
bills. Regardless, the Patriot Act was passed in the Senate by a vote of 98 to 1 and in the House
by a vote of 356 to 66. Clymer, supra note 125, at A1.
147. Among other things, the Patriot Act also addresses search and seizure authority, Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209-212, 215, 115 Stat. 272, 283–85, 287–88 (2001); money laundering, id. §§ 311-330, 115 Stat. at 298–320, and immigration standards. Id. §§ 401-428, 115 Stat.
at 342–63.
148. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 280 (2001); see also id. § 905,
115 Stat. at 389 (requiring that, whenever reasonably possible, “the Attorney General . . . shall
expeditiously disclose to the Director of Central Intelligence . . . foreign intelligence information
acquired by an element of the Department of Justice . . . in the course of a criminal investiga-
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foreign intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation, including information obtained as a result of a grand jury pro149
150
ceeding, can also be disclosed under the same conditions. Because
the definition of “foreign intelligence information” is sufficiently
broad that it encompasses virtually anything that could be construed
as a threat to national security, regardless of whether a U.S. person is
involved,151 the government can use the Patriot Act to disseminate
surveillance information more broadly than it did in the past. Thus,
the privacy concerns present may be more significant here than they
would otherwise be.
3. A Recently Publicized Opinion from the FISA Court Disclosed that, Even Before the Patriot Act was Enacted, the Executive
Branch Sometimes Failed to Comply with FISA Surveillance Requirements. In early 2002, the Department of Justice moved the FISA
Court to revise the existing FISA minimization procedures, which had
been in effect since 1995 and “regulate[d] the acquisition, retention
and dissemination of [FISA information].”152 In particular, the Department requested that the bright line restricting dissemination of
FISA information in overlapping intelligence and criminal investigations be eliminated.153 Sitting en banc, the judges on the FISA Court
tion.”). Also, “Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence . . . may consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate
or protect against [threats to the national security of the United States].” Id. § 504(a), 115 Stat.
at 364.
149. Id. § 203, 115 Stat. at 280. Disclosure may only occur subject to the conditions set by the
court allowing it, and “[w]ithin a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government [must] file . . . a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and [stating to whom disclosure was made].” Id. § 203(a)(V)(ii)–(iii), 115 Stat. at 280. For
a discussion of how the Patriot Act impacts grand jury proceedings, see generally Sara Sun
Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand Juries in the War on
Terrorism: Assessing the Patriot Act’s Changes in Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 699 (2002).
150. Patriot Act § 203(b)(2)(d), 115 Stat. at 280. The Director of Central Intelligence may
“establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected” pursuant to FISA and may also assist the Attorney General with coordinating the effective dissemination of the information so obtained, but the Director may not “direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance . . . operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized by
statute or Executive order.” Id. § 901, 115 Stat. at 387.
151. See id. § 203(a)(1)(iv), 115 Stat. at 280 (stating that “foreign intelligence information” is
information that “relates to the national defense or the security of the United States . . . [or] the
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States”).
152. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, No. 02-429,
2002 WL 1949263, at *3–4 (F.I.S. Ct. May 17, 2002) (en banc).
153. Id. at *10.

HENDERSON.DOC

206

11/15/02 2:56 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:179

unanimously rejected the Department’s request on the ground that it
154
was “not reasonably designed” to comply with the purpose of FISA.
In reaching this conclusion, the FISA Court expressly noted that the
Department had failed to comply on numerous past occasions with
the minimization procedures then in existence.155 Consequently, a
compelling argument can be made that it would be sensible to err on
the side of caution when determining the proper scope of the executive branch’s authority to conduct electronic surveillance.
C. The Patriot Act Contains Several Provisions Favorable to Privacy,
but These Provisions Are Not Sufficient to Counter the Potential
Threat.
Not every aspect of the Patriot Act that pertained to electronic
surveillance law impacted privacy negatively. In several instances, just
the opposite was true. For example, Congress could have broadened
the type of communications subject to CALEA. If it had, communications service providers would have been obligated to ensure that improvements in technology did not interfere with the government’s
156
ability to monitor targeted individuals. The Patriot Act, however,
imposed no such duty, and so the scope of CALEA remained un157
changed.
The Patriot Act also protects privacy in that it subjects to disciplinary procedures government officers that improperly disclose sur-

154. Id. at *13. The FISA Court rarely sits en banc and renders a decision. Letter from Hon.
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, Presiding Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, et al., http://www.epic.org/
privacy/terrorism/fisa/fisc_ltr_08_2002.html (Aug. 20, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(noting that the FISA Court had never before “issued an unclassified opinion and order”).
Senator Leahy stated that “this ray of sunshine from the judicial branch is a remarkable step
forward for constructive oversight.” Philip Shenon, Secret Court Says F.B.I. Aides Misled Judges
in 75 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A1.
155. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 2002 WL
1949263, at *8 (stating that, “in an alarming number of instances,” the results were “troubling”).
Specifically, beginning in March of 2000, FISA information was disseminated to law enforcement without the FISA Court’s authorization after the FISA Court had expressly instructed the
government that the court’s authorization was required. Id. at *9. Moreover, in September of
the same year, the government confessed to misstating and omitting facts on at least seventyfive FISA applications related to the investigation of terrorism. Id.
156. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
157. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 222, 115 Stat. 272, 292 (2001) (“Nothing in this
Act shall impose any additional technical obligation or requirement on a [communications
service] provider . . . to furnish facilities or technical assistance.”).
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158
veillance information. In addition, an aggrieved person can bring
suit against the United States, and, providing that the disclosure was
actually improper, the person will receive at least $10,000 in dam159
ages.
The Patriot Act also helps computer owners protect themselves
against unauthorized trespassers. Before the Patriot bill became law,
it was unclear whether the owner of a computer could obtain the assistance of law enforcement in monitoring people that engaged in
160
and “because [computer owners] often
computer trespassing,
lack[ed] the expertise, equipment, or financial resources required to
monitor attacks themselves, they [usually had] no effective way . . . to
161
protect themselves.” Now though, computer owners can authorize
law enforcement to assist them.162
Most significantly, in enacting the Patriot Act, Congress realized
that what seemed necessary in the immediate aftermath of September
11 might seem excessive several years later, especially if no further attacks ensued. For this reason, the Patriot Act explicitly provided that
some of the electronic surveillance provisions would sunset on De163
cember 31, 2005.
While the above provisions protect privacy to a limited extent,
they are not capable of countering the threat that the rest of the Patriot Act poses. In particular, the provisions above do nothing to protect the nonterrorist criminal suspect that could, as a result of it now
being easier to use FISA to circumvent Title III, potentially be at
greater risk of being investigated and prosecuted as a terrorist. Similarly, the provisions discussed above do not reduce the likelihood that
innocent citizens will have their real-time conversations intercepted
164
while roving surveillance is being conducted.

158. Id. § 223, 115 Stat. at 293.
159. Id.
160. FIELD GUIDANCE, supra note 134.
161. Id.
162. Patriot Act § 217, 115 Stat. at 291.
163. Id. § 224, 115 Stat. at 295 (stating that, while section 206 (roving surveillance authority
for FISA purposes) will sunset, section 203 (information sharing) and section 216 (pen/trap orders) will not).
164. That the roving surveillance provisions will sunset does not help those who may have
their innocent conversations intercepted in the meantime.
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CONCLUSION
Choices about electronic surveillance have always involved balancing privacy interests with national security concerns. Prior to September 11, there was not really any defining event that caused this
country to rethink the balance struck in the 1970s. In some ways at
least, it may seem more natural now for Congress to relax the conditions under which electronic surveillance can occur. In other ways
though, nothing has changed. Individual liberties still matter. Thus, it
is important not to alter the preexisting balance without good cause
and to be especially cognizant of privacy concerns when doing so.
The terrorist attacks clearly established sufficient cause, so the
question then becomes whether Congress adequately safeguarded
privacy to the extent possible. Here, it seems likely that, while most of
the modifications will not pose a significant threat, two of them may.
Namely, potentially allowing FISA to be used to circumvent Title III
intercept order requirements may unnecessarily put nonterrorists at
risk of being investigated and prosecuted as terrorists. Similarly, allowing roving surveillance to be conducted pursuant to FISA may result in the interception of numerous innocent conversations, many of
which will probably involve innocent American citizens.
The problem with these last two modifications is that, even
though they probably satisfy Fourth Amendment scrutiny on their
face, too much has been left to executive branch discretion. American
history teaches that insufficiently checked executive power to conduct
165
electronic surveillance is dangerous. Thus, where executive power
has increased, as it has here, Americans should be concerned that privacy may be unnecessarily threatened as a result. True, the Patriot
Act does contain some provisions that protect privacy, but these provisions by themselves are not enough to neutralize the threat. In addition, it is impossible to know the extent to which synergistic effects,
the information sharing provisions, or the fact that the executive
branch has not always complied with FISA in the past will further impact privacy concerns. As a result, it is all the more important that executive authority be checked to the appropriate degree.
Here, the courts could act as an independent check on executive
authority. Specifically, the courts could give substantive meaning to
the word “significant” when deciding whether to admit information
obtained from FISA surveillance in a criminal proceeding. If the gov165.

See supra Part I.B.1.
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ernment were unable to carry the burden of showing that national security had been a “significant purpose” of a FISA investigation, any
evidence so tainted could be excluded. In addition, when authorizing
roving FISA surveillance, the courts could require the government to
report back on a regular basis. That way, the courts would be able to
periodically reassess whether roving surveillance was still justified.
Because it does not seem that either of the measures described
above would unduly compromise the executive branch’s ability to
track suspected terrorists, both measures should be implemented. The
rationale for doing so would be that the increased benefit to privacy
would far outweigh any additional procedural burden that might be
incurred. It would be best if Congress could immediately incorporate
these improvements into statutory law. In the meantime, however,
the courts should hold that the above suggestions, or else something
very similar, are necessarily implied.
Fortunately, the judiciary may already have begun to move in
this direction. As discussed earlier, the FISA Court recently rejected
the request of the Department of Justice to eliminate the bright line
between intelligence gathering and criminal investigation. The FISA
Court’s rejection of an overly broad interpretation of the Patriot Act
is a good beginning, but that is all it is. Other courts will have to follow where the FISA Court has led. Simply put, the executive’s
authority to conduct electronic surveillance cannot be restricted as
Congress intended unless the judiciary remains cognizant of the oversight responsibilities with which it has been entrusted.
At the same time, Americans must realize that it would be a mistake to check executive authority too much. Sadly, the world is full of
people that despise the United States and the way of life that it represents. As the September 11 attacks demonstrate, some of these people who hate America pose a serious threat, and thus the American
government necessarily must have the power to identify, monitor, and
bring such people to justice. Nothing in this Note should be interpreted as suggesting that the preexisting law should not have been altered. The nation had been injured, and because the status quo was at
least partially to blame, Congress had to make it easier for the government to protect national security. This Note merely seeks to emphasize that, in the context of electronic surveillance, it may be possible to both protect national security and provide greater protection
for privacy than currently exists.

